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IN THE CASE OF A PREGNANT BOARD MEMBER?
Siniša PetroviÊ and Petar Ceronja∗
Summary: The Court of Justice of the European Union (Second Cham-
ber) on 11 November 2010 pronounced a judgment in the proceed-
ings between Ms Dita Danosa and LKB Lizings SIA, a limited liabil-
ity company, concerning the decision of the LKB general meeting of 
shareholders to remove Ms Danosa from her post as a member of the 
company’s board of directors during her pregnancy. The Court’s ruling 
could have signifi cant repercussions on the appointment to and termi-
nation of the membership of boards of directors of capital companies 
in Europe. The authors analyse the corporate effects of the judgment 
in various countries from the point of view of the principles of company 
law and emphasise the difference in the contractual and corporate re-
lationships which exist between a company and members of the board 
of directors. When analysing the ruling of the Court, the authors also 
point out the differences between public limited companies (both dual 
and single-board systems) and limited liability companies in terms of 
the position of members of the board of directors with regard to the 
termination of membership of the board.
1 Introduction
The Court of Justice of the European Union has a signifi cant role in 
the interpretation and application of European Union directives. Although 
judgments of the Court are not considered as an immediate source of law 
for Member States, besides cases before the Court, they also have an in-
fl uence on national legislation and the judgments of national courts. This 
is the reason why the Court, when rendering a judgment in a particular 
case, needs to evaluate not only the facts of the case before it combined 
with the applicable EU directives, but also the wider implications of its 
rulings. 
The Republic of Croatia, soon to be a Member State of the EU, has a 
company law system based on the German and Austrian systems. Thus, 
alongside the provisions of Croatian company law in the area of termina-
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tion of membership of the board of directors, German and Austrian rules 
and, more importantly, legal practice will be analysed.
It will be shown that there are great differences in the positions of 
members of the board of directors in public limited companies (joint-stock 
companies) and limited liability companies in the above-mentioned legal 
systems. The Court did not consider these differences in its ruling. It is 
an omission of the Court, from the author’s point of view, not to take into 
account company law rules and principles when rendering a judgment in 
the present case. It will be demonstrated that there is a way to protect the 
social and material rights of pregnant members of boards of directors with-
out interfering in the widely accepted corporate rules on the termination 
of membership of the board of directors which protect the best interests of 
the company, but also the interests of the board members. 
2 The Danosa case
2.1 The facts of the case
On 21 December 2006, Ms Dita Danosa was appointed as a member 
of the board of directors of LKB Lizings SIA (hereinafter LKB), a limited 
liability company.1 By a decision of 11 January 2007, LKB’s supervisory 
board set the remuneration of the members of the company’s board of 
directors and entrusted the chairman of the board with concluding all the 
necessary agreements for the implementation of the decision.2
The general meeting of shareholders removed Ms Danosa from her 
post as a member of the board of directors on 23 July 2007.3 Ms Danosa 
considered she had been unlawfully dismissed from her position as a 
member of the board and brought an action against LKB before Riga 
Central District Court.4 Given the fact that she was 11 weeks pregnant 
at that time, her dismissal was in breach of Article 109 of the Latvian 
Labour Code which prohibits the dismissal of pregnant workers.5 On the 
other hand, Article 224 paragraph 4 of the Latvian Commercial Code 
authorises the general meeting of shareholders to dismiss a member of 
the board at any time, which according to Ms Danosa is in confl ict with 
Article 109 of the Latvian Labour Code.6
1  Case C-232/09 Dita Danosa v LKB Lizings SIA [2010] ECR I-11405, para 20.
2  Danosa (n 1) para 21. The nature of the contract concluded between Ms Danosa and LKB 
was not clear. According to the order for reference, no civil contract between Ms Danosa and 
LKB was concluded, although LKB asserts that a contract of agency had been concluded.
3  Danosa (n 1) para 23. 
4  Danosa (n 1) para 24.
5  Danosa (n 1) para 25.
6  Danosa (n 1) para 25.
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Ms Danosa’s action was dismissed both in the fi rst instance and on 
appeal. She lodged an appeal before the Latvian Supreme Court.7 She 
claimed that even though she was a member of the board of directors of 
a capital company, she should be treated as a worker in the sense of EU 
law, namely Council Directive 92/85/EEC8 of 19 October 1992 on the 
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given 
birth or breastfeeding (hereinafter Council Directive 92/85/EEC).9 On 
the other hand, LKB argued that members of a capital company’s board 
of directors do not perform their tasks and duties under the direction of 
another person, and thus cannot be treated as workers.10
The Latvian Supreme Court decided to stay the proceedings and to 
refer two questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
a) are the members of the directorial body of a capital company to be 
regarded as covered by the concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning 
of Community law?
b) is Article 224(4) of the Latvian Commercial Code, under which 
a member of the board of directors of a capital company may be 
dismissed without restriction, with no account being taken spe-
cifi cally of the fact that she is pregnant, incompatible with Article 
10 of Council Directive 92/85/EEC and the case law of the Court 
of Justice?11
2.2 The Advocate General’s opinion
When considering the fi rst question, Advocate General Bot pointed 
out the criteria for the concept of ‘worker’ under Council Directive 92/85/
EEC. A person is regarded as a worker when three conditions are met: 
the performance of services, in return for remuneration, for and under 
the direction of another person.12
The question of performing duties under the direction of another was 
in fact a matter of dispute between Ms Danosa and LKB. The Advocate 
General concluded that a member of a capital company’s board of direc-
tors can be regarded as carrying out his/her duties in the context of a 
7  Danosa (n 1) para 26.
8  Danosa (n 1) para 27.
9  Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers 
who have recently given birth or breastfeeding OJ L348/1, 1-7.
10  Danosa (n 1) para 28.
11  Danosa (n 1) para 30.
12  Danosa (n 1) Opinion of AG Bot, para 3. 
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relationship of subordination and, accordingly, can be treated as a work-
er within the meaning of Council Directive 92/85/EEC.13 The fact that 
the parties did not conclude a contract of employment and concluded a 
contract of agency cannot determine the categorisation of their working 
relationship and whether the applicant was employed or self-employed 
for the purposes of Council Directive 92/85/EEC.14
The Advocate General concluded, after analysing the relationship 
between the applicant and LKB, that Ms Danosa was in fact a ‘worker’ 
because all three necessary conditions had been met:
a) by virtue of the conditions in accordance with which she was ap-
pointed, she formed an integral part of the company;
b) she performed her duties under the control of bodies such as the 
shareholders’ meeting or the supervisory board, which she did 
not control or over which she was unable to exercise a decisive 
infl uence;
c) she could be removed from her post by one or other of those bod-
ies on the sole ground that they had lost confi dence in her.15
When considering the second question, the Advocate General point-
ed out that the national court was in fact asking whether Article 10 of 
Council Directive 92/85/EEC must be interpreted as precluding national 
legislation under which a member of a capital company’s board of direc-
tors can be removed from that position without any restriction, especially 
regarding her pregnancy.16 In the Advocate General’s opinion, Article 10 
of Council Directive 92/85/EEC requires Member States to adopt the 
necessary provisions to prohibit the dismissal of a worker on grounds 
13  Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 64. The Advocate General, among other things, points 
out that in order to assess whether a director is in a relationship of subordination, it is 
necessary to take into account all the elements which characterise that person’s working 
relationship with the company and to have regard, in the course of that assessment, to the 
nature of his duties, Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 75.
14  Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 67.
15  Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 99. However, the Advocate General in his fi nal conclu-
sion in paragraph 131 of the Judgement, when writing about the conditions for consider-
ing a board member as a ‘worker’, points out she was performing her duties ‘under the 
supervision of company bodies’. Although the Advocate General probably uses the words 
‘supervision’ and ‘control’ as synonyms, we believe it is important to emphasise the pos-
sible differences between these two terms. The term ‘supervision’ is used in a dual-board 
system of public limited companies where supervisory boards have the authority to super-
vise the board of directors, but not the authority to give mandatory business instructions 
to the board. The term ‘control’, unlike the term ‘direction’ does not have a specifi c legal 
meaning in company law legislation and its use is merely explanatory. For further analysis, 
see n 23.
16  Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 102.
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relating to her pregnancy.17 It does not prohibit dismissal during the 
period of protection laid down in Article 10 for workers if the termination 
is based on other grounds provided for under national legal systems.18
The Advocate General concluded that Article 10 of Council Directive 
92/85 EEC precludes national legislation (eg Article 224(4) of the Latvian 
Commercial Code) under which a member of a capital company’s board 
of directors may be removed from that position without restriction if the 
national legislation permits dismissal on grounds relating to pregnancy.19 
It is for the national courts to verify that the grounds for dismissing the 
board member are not related to pregnancy.20 
2.3 The judgment21
When considering the fi rst question, the Court, among other things, 
pointed out that the answer to the question of whether a relationship of 
17  Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 104.
18  Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 104. Article 224(4) of the Latvian Commercial Code pro-
vides a lower level of protection than the national rules applicable to other workers, which 
is, in the Advocate General’s opinion, not contrary to Article 10(1) of Council Directive 
92/85/EEC under the condition that it applies to women workers who are in different situ-
ations, which could fall within the scope of the margin of discretion that Article 10(1) of the 
Directive expressly leaves to Member States, Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 107.
19  Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 108.
20  Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 109. If, however, the national court fi nds that the grounds for 
dismissal are related to pregnancy, Article 224(4) of the Latvian Commercial Code, for example, 
would not provide a lawful basis for that dismissal, Opinion of AG Bot (n 12) para 109.
21  The second Chamber of the Court ruled as follows:
a) A member of a capital company’s board of directors who provides services to that company 
and is an integral part of it must be regarded as having the status of worker for the purposes 
of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to en-
courage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who 
have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning 
of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), if that activity is carried out, for some time, under 
the direction or supervision of another body of that company and if, in return for those activi-
ties, the board member receives remuneration. It is for the national court to undertake the 
assessments of fact necessary to determine whether that is so in the case pending before it.
b) Article 10 of Directive 92/85 is to be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings, which permits a member of a capital company’s board 
of directors to be removed from that post without restriction, where the person concerned is 
a ‘pregnant worker’ within the meaning of that directive and the decision to remove her was 
taken essentially on account of her pregnancy. Even if the board member concerned is not a 
‘pregnant worker’ within the meaning of Directive 92/85, the fact remains that the removal, 
on account of pregnancy or essentially on account of pregnancy, of a member of a board of di-
rectors who performs duties such as those described in the main proceedings can affect only 
women and therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex, contrary to Article 
2(1) and (7) and Article 3(1)(c) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, as amended by Di-
rective 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002.
442 Petar Ceronja, Siniπa PetroviÊ: Corporate Effects of the Danosa Case...
subordination, which was one of the crucial questions of the dispute, ex-
ists within the meaning of the defi nition of the concept of ‘worker’ must, 
in each particular case, be arrived at on the basis of all the factors and 
circumstances characterising the relationship between the parties.22
In paragraph 39, the Court sets out the objective criteria for defi ning 
the concept of ‘worker’ for the purposes of Directive 92/85 according to 
the relevant EU case law. A person is considered to be a worker if she/
he performs services for and under the direction of another person for a 
certain period of time, in return for which she/he receives remuneration. 
But, how do these objective criteria apply in cases such as the case at 
hand, when the person considered is a member of a directorial body of 
a company? The Court in paragraph 51 further interprets these objec-
tive criteria taking into consideration the specifi c duties entrusted to the 
board members, as well as the context in which these duties are per-
formed and the manner in which they are performed. The Court provides 
additional criteria and remarks for deciding when a member of a board is 
to be considered a ‘worker’. Board members who, in return for remunera-
tion, provide services to the company which has appointed them and of 
which they are an integral part, who carry out their activities under the 
direction or control of another body of that company and who can, at any 
time, be removed from their duties without such removal being sub-
ject to any restriction, satisfy prima facie the criteria for being treated as 
workers within the meaning of the case law of the Court. However, when 
the Court summarised the criteria and considerations for a member of 
a capital company’s board of directors to be a ‘worker’ for the purposes 
of Directive 92/85 in paragraph 56 of the judgment and, more impor-
tantly, in point 1 of the ruling, it surprisingly left out one of the remarks 
made in paragraph 51: removal from duties without any restriction. This 
is an omission of the Court which could have serious consequences for 
the understanding of the concept of a member of a board of directors as 
a worker in certain national legal systems.23 The question of whether a 
22  Danosa (n 1) para 46. In this particular case, the fact that Ms Danosa was a member of 
the board of directors of a capital company is not enough in itself to rule out the possibility 
that she was in a relationship of subordination to that company. It is necessary to consider 
the circumstances in which the board member was recruited; the nature of the duties en-
trusted to that person; the context in which those duties were performed; the scope of the 
person’s powers and the extent to which he or she was supervised within the company; and 
the circumstances under which the person could be removed, Danosa (n 1) para 47.
23  For example, German law and national company law legislation which is based on Ger-
man legislative solutions, eg that of Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia. Furthermore, the Court 
in paragraph 51 uses the term ‘direction or control’ of another body, but in paragraph 56, 
and more importantly in the fi rst point of the ruling, uses the term ‘direction or supervision’. 
This just goes to show that the Court is not aware of the different meanings of the words 
‘supervision’ and ‘control’ combined with the term ‘direction’ in company law. Supervision 
is the duty of the supervisory board of a public limited company. Direction, on the other 
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director can scrutinise the removal according to the applicable company 
law rules is one of the key elements for establishing the relationship of 
subordination. It will be shown that the concept of a board member as a 
worker depends on the type of capital company.
When considering the second question, the Court followed the opin-
ion of the Advocate General and went a step further in providing protec-
tion for Ms Danosa under Directive 76/207, which ensures equal treat-
ment for men and women regarding access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions. Furthermore, the Court 
pointed out that whichever directive applies, it is important to ensure for 
the person concerned the protection granted under EU law to pregnant 
women in cases where the legal relationship linking her to another per-
son has been severed on account of her pregnancy.24
The problem appears when the wording of point 2 of the ruling is 
read closely. The words ‘who performs duties such as those described 
in the main proceedings’ are not precise enough because of the differ-
ences in the criteria in paragraphs 51 and 56 of the judgment. The duties 
described in the main proceedings surely include carrying out activities 
under direction or supervision, but what about removal from their du-
ties without any restriction? This is a question which asks for a precise 
answer because of the rules regulating the appointment and termination 
of membership of a board of directors in capital companies in certain 
European countries.
3  Termination of membership of the board of directors of a public 
limited company
Capital companies are the most important types of legal entities for 
doing business in the Republic of Croatia and Europe in general. The du-
ties and responsibilities of persons responsible for conducting the com-
pany’s business vary depending on the type of company.
The differences between the two-tier system (dual-board system) of 
a public limited company, the one-tier system (single-board system) of 
a public limited company, and corporate governance in limited liability 
companies need to be analysed and addressed taking into account the 
ruling in the Danosa case. Differences in the corporate position of mem-
hand, is the duty of a board of directors of a single-board public limited company towards 
the executive offi cers of the company and the shareholders’ meeting of a limited liability 
company towards the board of directors. ‘Direction’ combined with ‘control’ thus refers 
only to a single-board public limited company and a limited liability company (paragraph 
51), and ‘direction’ combined with ‘supervision’ refers to all types of capital companies.
24  Danosa (n 1) para 70.
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bers of boards of directors in these companies are greatly infl uenced by 
the appointment procedure and the reasons, possibilities and procedures 
for recall of the appointment of board members.
Various countries have different models and rules of corporate gov-
ernance in public limited companies. In general, it may be stated that 
national laws either prescribe a one-tier system (single-board system)25 or 
a two-tier system (dual-board system),26 while some countries allow both 
systems.27 This means it is up to every single company to choose which 
system it will have and to apply it in practice.28 However, this should not 
be understood as the possibility of combining the systems, ie to pick and 
choose the rules which the company likes from either system. The right of 
choice should consequently also be viewed as an obligation to fully apply 
and follow the rules applicable to the chosen system29 and equally to use 
the proper terminology.30
3.1 The dual-board system
The dual-board system (two-tier system) of a public limited company 
is the usual system for the incorporation of public limited companies in 
Croatia. The reason for this is the fact that the possibility of choosing 
the organisation of a public limited company’s boards has existed in the 
Croatian Companies Act since 2007. Until the Companies Act amend-
ments in 2007, a dual board was the only option for the internal or-
ganisation of a public limited company. The infl uence of the German 
and Austrian legal systems on the Croatian legal system in the area of 
company law is thus more than evident.
Members of the board of directors in a dual-board system are ap-
pointed by the supervisory board for a maximum period of fi ve years, 
25  For example, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland.
26  For example, Austria, Germany and Poland.
27  For example, Croatia, France, Italy and Slovenia.
28  Very few companies have, for example, chosen the one-tier system of corporate gov-
ernance in Croatia since this possibility was introduced into the Croatian legal system in 
2007.
29  For example, the corporate structure of INA, the Croatian national oil company, is a typi-
cal case of picking and choosing rules form both systems. Even though INA is a dual-board 
company, the board of directors appointed a group of so-called executives in an Executive 
Committee, which is not allowed according to the dual-board rules of corporate governance. 
This practice may lead to problems of misrepresentation, legal uncertainty and to confusion 
for third parties.
30  For example, in Croatian practice, companies managed by the two-tier system some-
times use an expression such as ‘president and chief executive offi cer’, although the person 
is president of the board of directors. Similarly, a person who is a member of the board of 
directors may be called ‘senior vice president’. 
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with the possibility of re-election.31 The appointment is the exclusive right 
and duty of the supervisory board and cannot be delegated to another 
body, commission, etc.32 For the appointment to be valid, the decision of 
the supervisory board needs to be declared to the future board members 
and accepted by the members of the board. Recall of appointment of a 
member of the board of directors is also the responsibility and right of 
the supervisory board. A member of a board of directors can be recalled 
only when an important reason for his/her recall exists.33 The existence 
of an important reason as grounds for recall of a board member is the ex-
pression of a rule by which a board of directors manages company busi-
ness independently without the interference of other company bodies. 
This rule ensures the much needed autonomy of the board of directors 
by preventing arbitrary and frivolous recalls by the supervisory board.34 
The rule is vital for encouraging members of the board of directors to be 
creative and to take reasonable business risks.35 Members of the board of 
directors need to be in a position of not conducting the company’s busi-
ness according to the instructions and desires of a supervisory board, 
taking into account fi rst and foremost the criteria of a reasonable busi-
nessman.36
The existence of an important reason for the recall of an appoint-
ment must be determined individually in each particular case.37 An im-
portant reason is thus a legal standard which gains its substance with 
each decision of a supervisory board. The supervisory board needs to 
determine facts which are important and grave enough to constitute an 
important reason. If the decision of the supervisory board is based on a 
reason which in the opinion of the member of the board is not important, 
the recalled board member has the right to determine the validity or inva-
lidity of his/her recall in a court of law.38 Thus, the courts have the fi nal 
word in deciding whether the termination of membership of a board of 
directors has been conducted lawfully.
31  Article 244(1) of the Croatian Companies Act, Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 
No 111/93, 34/99, 52/00, 118/03, 107/07, 146/08, 137/09; Article 84(1) of the German 
Aktiengesetz; Article 75 (1) of the Austrian Aktiengesetz.
32  J BarbiÊ, Pravo društava - društva kapitala, vol 1 (Organizator 2010) 688.
33  Croatian Companies Act (n 31) Article 244(2); Article 84(3) of the German Aktiengesetz; 
Article 75(4) of the Austrian Aktiengesetz.
34  BarbiÊ (n 32) 763.
35  BarbiÊ (n 32) 763.
36  J. BarbiÊ, ‘Board of Directors in Capital Companies’ (1997) Hrvatska gospodarska revija 
1327.
37  BarbiÊ (n 32) 764.
38  Croatian Companies Act (n 31) Article 244(2); Article 84(3) of the German Aktiengesetz; 
Article 75(4) of the Austrian Aktiengesetz.
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Important reasons for the recall of a board member include gross 
breaches of duty by the board member, inability to conduct the com-
pany’s business in an orderly way, and withdrawal of confi dence by the 
general meeting.39
3.1.1 Gross breaches of duty
For the existence of gross breaches of duty it is not important to 
prove the guilt or gross negligence of the board member.40 When deciding 
on the existence of such a reason for recall, the supervisory board needs 
to take into account the best interests of the company. Insignifi cant and 
minor breaches of duty (eg minor offences) cannot usually constitute an 
important reason for recall of a board member. Examples of many differ-
ent gross breaches of duty can be found in the extremely rich and diverse 
German judicial practice.41
3.1.2 Inability to conduct the company’s business in an orderly way
This reason exists when a board member is not capable of carrying 
out all usual, standard activities as a board member, and also when a 
board member no longer has certain characteristics and qualities which 
made him/her the best candidate for membership of the board of di-
rectors.42 Guilt or gross negligence is not a requirement for recall for 
this particular reason.43 German judicial practice is once again the main 
source of examples of inability to conduct a company’s business in an 
orderly manner.44 
39  Croatian Companies Act (n 31) Article 244(2); Article 84(3) of the German Aktiengesetz; 
Article 75(4) of the Austrian Aktiengesetz.
40  BarbiÊ (n 32) 764.
41  U Hüffer, Aktiengesetzkommentar (Verlag CH Beck 2010) Rn 28 § 84 Aktiengesetz; G 
Spindler in W Goette, M Habersack and S Kalss (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Aktienge-
setz, vol 2 (Verlag CH Beck, Verlag Franz Vahlen 2008) Rn 120 § 84 Aktiengesetz; M Weber 
in W Hölters (ed), Aktiengesetz Kommentar (Verlag CH Beck 2011) Rn 74 § 84 Aktiengesetz. 
On Austrian law, see S Kalss, C Nowotny and M Schauer, Oestereichisches Gesellschaftrecht 
(ManzVerlag 2008) 655. For example, concluding speculative contracts; criminal offences of 
board members, even in the private domain; taking and giving bribes; usurping company 
assets; extraordinarily high company indebtedness; inappropriately high indebtedness of 
board members; inappropriate conduct by a board member that is damaging to the reputa-
tion of the company; using the position as board member mainly for personal profi t; ma-
nipulating fi nancial reports of the company; manipulating stored goods of the company; 
verbal and physical attacks on shareholders; acting against Corporate Governance Codes. 
These cases can also be applied in Croatian law, BarbiÊ (n 32) 764 and 768.
42  J Pichler and E Weninger, Der Vorstand der AG, (LexisNexis Verlag 2004) 37.
43  Pichler and E Weninger (n 42) 38.
44  Hüffer (n 41) Rn 28 § 84; Spindler (n 41) Rn 120 § 84 Aktiengesetz; Weber (n 41) Rn 74 
§ 84 Aktiengesetz. For example, lack of necessary skills and knowledge of the board mem-
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3.1.3 Withdrawal of confi dence by the general meeting
The general meeting of the shareholders does not have a direct in-
fl uence on the appointment and recall of board members. This is the 
exclusive authority of the supervisory board. There is no hierarchy be-
tween the bodies of a public limited company. The general meeting, on 
the other hand, has the authority to exonerate members of the board 
of directors for their conduct of the company’s business. If the general 
meeting refuses to exonerate a member of the board, this constitutes one 
of the important reasons for the recall of a board member. In such a case, 
the supervisory board can decide to recall a member of the board of direc-
tors, but will not do so if the vote to refuse to exonerate a member of the 
board was reached on an evidently unjustifi able basis.45
3.2 The single-board system
The board of directors and general meeting are the mandatory bodies 
of a public limited company with a single-board organisation system. The 
board of directors must appoint at least one executive offi cer. The single-
board system of organisation concentrates the duties of conducting the 
company’s business and the supervision of the conduct of the company’s 
business in a single body: the board of directors.46 The board of directors 
has the authority to decide on all signifi cant business decisions, the stra-
tegic management of the company, and the way of conducting the com-
pany’s business. Executive offi cers, on the other hand, are authorised to 
conduct the company’s business on a day-to-day basis.
Even though they conduct the company’s business, their position is 
quite different from the position of a board of directors in a dual-board 
system. Executive offi cers need to conduct the company’s business sub-
ject to the direction, control and mandatory instructions of the board of 
directors. They can be recalled at any time, without any particular, impor-
tant reason, and without the possibility of scrutinising the justifi cation 
for the decision of the board of directors in a court of law.47 The decision 
ber, unreliability of the board member, animosity towards other members of the board, etc. 
Long-lasting sickness and health problems are also considered as reasons for termination 
of membership of a board of directors. Although pregnancy and long-lasting sickness can-
not be compared in any way, this reason for recalling a director could be relevant in the 
context of the Danosa case. Certain health problems are not gender neutral and can affect 
only women or men. Could Council Directive 76/207/EEC also be applied analogously in 
these cases? Our position is that it cannot, because corporate rules are a lex specialis for 
such hypothetical situations.
45  Croatian Companies Act (n 31) Article 244 (2); Article 84 (3) of the German Aktiengesetz; 
Article 75 (4) of the Austrian Aktiengesetz.
46  BarbiÊ (n 32) 1006.
47  BarbiÊ.(n 32) 1006.
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of the board of directors of the company does not need to be adopted in 
any particular form. Therefore, we can conclude that a hierarchy of rela-
tions exists between the board of directors and the executive offi cers in 
single-board public limited companies. This conclusion basically means 
that the existence of control and supervision of the board of directors over 
executive offi cers makes executives suitable candidates to be considered 
as ‘workers’ within the meaning of Council Directive 92/85/EEC.
4 Termination of membership of the board of directors of a limited 
liability company
Limited liability companies are the most common legal entity in the 
Republic of Croatia.48 The board of directors and shareholders’ meeting 
are the mandatory bodies of a limited liability company. The supervisory 
board is an optional body, mandatory only in several cases required by 
law.49 When comparing the duties and responsibilities of bodies in a lim-
ited liability company with those of public limited company bodies, we 
can conclude that the relationship between the bodies in a limited liabil-
ity company is similar to the structure of a single-board public limited 
company.50 Directors of a limited liability company have essentially the 
same corporate position as executive offi cers in a single-board public 
limited company.
The board of directors of a limited liability company needs to con-
duct the company’s business in accordance with the articles of associa-
tion of the company, decisions of the company’s shareholders and man-
datory instructions of the shareholders’ meeting and supervisory board, 
if the company has one. The shareholders’ meeting is a body which has 
a prior duty and responsibility to appoint and recall the directors of the 
company.51 This authority can be transferred to the supervisory board, 
some or just one of the shareholders or to certain other bodies of the com-
pany.52 Members of the board of directors can be recalled at any time53 by 
the shareholders’ meeting or supervisory board, without any particular 
or important reason, and without the opportunity to scrutinise the justi-
fi cation for the decision in court proceedings. The decision of the share-
holders’ meeting or supervisory board of the company does not need to 
be explained or elaborated on in any particular form. Shareholders may 
48  As they are in other European countries.
49  Croatian Companies Act (n 31) Article 434(1, 2).
50  J BarbiÊ, Pravo društava - Društva kapitala, vol 2 (5th edn 2010) 320.
51  Croatian Companies Act (n 31) Article 441(1).
52  BarbiÊ (n 50) 335.
53  Croatian Companies Act (n 31) Article 424(1); Article 38(1) of the German GmbHGesetz; 
Article 16(1) of the Austrian GmbHGesetz.
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prescribe the possibility of recalling a board member in the articles of as-
sociation only where there is an important reason, but this possibility is 
rarely used and is not recommended.
In limited liability companies, the directors of the company are often 
shareholders of the same company.54 If we take into consideration the 
criteria of the Court for the concept of a ‘worker’, in a case where the ma-
jor shareholder is also a member of the board of directors, the criterion 
of performing duties under ‘direction and supervision’ is not met. At the 
same time, the majority shareholder is not likely to dismiss her/himself.
5 Implications of the judgment of the Court
5.1 Substantive issues
First of all, it is to be stressed that the relationship between the 
director of the company and the company itself is twofold. On the one 
hand, it is purely contractual (eg a work contract, agency contract, man-
agement contract), and on the other is based on the provisions of corpo-
rate law.55 The latter means that the position of the director is based on 
the provisions of the corporate laws (corporate governance) providing for 
his/her competences and rights and obligations vis-a-vis the company. 
Probably, the basic feature of this relationship is the trust of the com-
pany56 towards its director. A company is and should in principle always 
have the opportunity to appoint and remove from offi ce a director who 
does not satisfy the managerial requirements imposed upon him/her, as 
defi ned by the company’s policy, objectives and business plans.57
Of course, the issue of appointment, and even more so removal from 
offi ce, is regulated by law and it is at the company’s discretion only within 
54  This is not a surprise because limited liability companies are a legal form much more 
suitable for small and medium businesses. The case where the same person is at the same 
time a sole director of the company and the only shareholder is quite common.
55  This is clearly stated in Article 244(2) of the Croatian Companies Act and Article 84(3) of 
the German Aktiengesetz for public limited companies and in Article 424(1) of the Croatian 
Companies Act and Article 38(1) of the German GmbHGesetz for limited liability companies. 
The provision basically states that the recall of the director from the position of member of 
the board does not in any way infl uence rights arising out of a contract between the com-
pany and a board member.
56  This primarily means the company shareholders and, depending on the legal form of the 
company, other corporate bodies, eg in the case of a public limited company governed by a 
dual-board system, the supervisory board.
57  Lack of trust by the company in the director’s skills and dissatisfaction with his/her 
performance should be suffi cient grounds for his/her removal from offi ce. In this respect, 
it should be borne in mind that the director is the company’s legal representative and its 
proxy, and his actions are considered as the actions of the company. Thus, anything that 
the director does has a direct effect on the company’s well-being, its position on the market 
and ultimately its destiny and future.
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the framework set out by the law. This means that the articles of associa-
tion of a company may regulate the issue of appointment and removal 
from offi ce only to the extent that the law allows and may not go beyond 
this. The level of the company’s autonomy in this respect depends, as 
shown in the prior sections of this note, on the legal form of the company. 
In general terms, it may be stated that the highest level of autonomy ex-
ists in a limited liability company while, by way of contrast, provisions 
are mostly mandatory in a public limited company with a dual-board 
system.
Even if we take as the starting point the fact that different internal 
organisations of various companies, depending on their legal form and 
corporate governance systems, provide for different rules regarding the 
recall of directors, it should ultimately always be remembered that, as 
pointed out, the director needs to enjoy the trust of the company, since 
otherwise the whole system of corporate governance is in vain.
Taking that trust as the focal point, from the corporate law point of 
view, it is actually of no relevance what the reason is for the lack of trust.58 
This is notably so in the case of directors in a limited liability company 
and in a single-board public limited company. Thus, if a director may 
be recalled without any particular reason and without the legal obliga-
tion of the company to justify the recall,59 it makes no difference whether 
this was done due to long-term illness, managerial incompetence or the 
company’s general dissatisfaction with the director. Consequently, if a 
company60 believes that its director no longer enjoys its trust, he/she 
may be recalled. Even more so, if the company concludes that the direc-
tor is not capable of performing his/her tasks, he/she may be removed. 
In an objective factual situation that a director is in a position that he/
she may not come to work or not work suffi ciently to satisfy the needs of 
the company, the company should have every right to recall the director. 
There should be no doubt about this, irrespective of the reasons for this 
situation, whether it is due to the director’s health, laziness, taking up 
58  In spite of this, it naturally depends on legal provisions as to whether the recall of a di-
rector may only be due to an important reason (as is the case in a dual-board public limited 
company) or whether he/she may be removed from offi ce without any particular reason 
(executive directors in a single-board public limited company and directors in a limited li-
ability company).
59  This results in the logical consequence that the recall may in principle not be scruti-
nised, even by a court. Nevertheless, if the recall is carried out contrary to the provisions 
of the contract (of whatever type) between the company and director, this might lead to 
the company’s obligation to compensate the director. At the same time, however, recall is 
considered valid from the point of view of corporate law and the recalled person is no longer 
considered to be a director of the company. 
60  Ie, the corporate body responsible for making the decision on the director’s removal from 
offi ce.
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additional work or starting a private business. Bearing in mind the need 
to take care of the well-being of the company, this should apply even in 
the case of the pregnancy of a female director of the company. Company 
law, especially in a limited liability company does not deal with the rea-
sons for a lack of trust. Therefore, protection with regard to pregnancy or 
protection of any other kind should not interfere with the shareholders’ 
rights to remove a director from his/her corporate position at any time. 
One of the main features of a limited liability company is the sharehold-
ers’ key infl uence on conducting company business. If legislation and 
jurisprudence start to limit this infl uence, which is mainly based on the 
shareholders’ right to remove directors from their position at any time 
(for example, if members of the board refuse to follow through the busi-
ness decisions of shareholders), this could diminish the attractiveness of 
limited liability companies for future investors.
In this respect, it must be stressed that recall is actually not carried 
out because of pregnancy (which would defi nitely be contrary to anti-
discrimination laws), but because of the fact that the director is not in a 
position to perform her duties. To emphasise, removal from offi ce is not a 
consequence of pregnancy, but a consequence of the inability of the per-
son concerned to perform her duties as a director, whatever the reason 
for this.
It could be stated that any employee who is dismissed because of 
pregnancy is being dismissed because they are unable to work rather 
than because of pregnancy. These are, however, two different situations. 
When an employee is dismissed, the company terminates all relations 
between the employee and the company by terminating the employee’s 
employment contract or any other similar contract. Recall of a female 
director does not necessarily mean the termination of a labour, agency or 
any other similar contract between the director and the company. Only 
the corporate relationship between the director and the company is being 
severed, while the contractual relationship is resolved according to the 
applicable contractual rules (primarily the contract) and not corporate 
rules. This actually means that the director’s salary and other material 
rights can be protected according to national and international pro-ma-
ternity regulations. In other words, pregnant directors will be paid ac-
cording to their contract during their pregnancy and maternity leave, but 
they will not perform the director’s duties. Furthermore, the duties and 
responsibilities of a director and any other employee, regardless of the 
employee’s position and importance, are quite different. The will of the 
director is the will of the company, even though the director in a limited 
liability company needs to perform under the directions of the sharehold-
ers if the shareholders wish to exercise their right to give mandatory in-
structions. Board members are legal representatives of the company, and 
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their right to represent the company cannot be limited. The position of a 
board member is thus much more similar to the position of an employer 
rather than that of an employee. 
 As noted in the paragraph above, a completely different issue is that 
of respect for a female director’s right as a pregnant woman. Her fi nancial 
and social rights arising from the contract with the company should be 
respected and fully honoured. It should be noted once again that accord-
ing to the rules and principles of company law, the relationship between 
the director of the company and the company itself is twofold. One is 
purely contractual and the other is based on the provisions of corporate 
law. When accepting an appointment, a director negotiates the terms 
of the employment/management/agency contract between her/him and 
the company (e.g. salary, stock/share options, bonuses, termination of 
contract). Premature termination of a corporate relationship does not 
necessarily mean the termination of a contractual relationship. Managers 
usually negotiate fi nancial compensation for recalls of appointment such 
as lump sum monetary payments or a couple of months’ salary after the 
termination of their appointment. This means that a pregnant director’s 
rights arising from the contract should be protected via pro-maternity 
legislation in the same way in which the rights of pregnant workers are 
protected. Extending such protection to the corporate law sphere could 
be detrimental to the well-being of the company.61
The situation is different in the case of a dual-board public limited 
company, whose director may be removed from offi ce only for an impor-
tant reason and with the necessity of stating the reason in a decision 
which is subject to supervision by the courts. Such important reasons 
might be gross negligence in the performing of the director’s duties (gross 
breaches of duty), inability to perform those duties or a lack of trust to-
wards the director by the shareholders. Thus, the difference in compari-
son with limited liability and single-board public limited companies is 
in the obligation of the company to state the reason for the recall of the 
director. However, in the case at hand there is actually no crucial sub-
stantive difference. In principle, in a dual-board public limited company, 
if a director is incapable of performing his/her duties due to sickness, 
there is an important reason for his/her recall. Any reason leading to 
the impossibility of performing his/her duties provides suffi cient grounds 
61  We might imagine a situation where the articles of association provide for only one di-
rector. If the current director may not be recalled, the company’s actual existence is jeop-
ardised. A similar situation is where two or more directors exercise joint representation of 
the company. This cannot be remedied by a simple change in the articles of association, 
because the procedure for changes in the articles of association is much more complex 
than the procedure for the recall of the appointment of a director, especially in single-board 
public limited companies. 
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for recall. This should also apply to pregnancy. However, as previously 
stressed, the reason for recall is not the pregnancy itself, but rather the 
fact that the pregnant director cannot perform her duties, if that is the 
case.62
5.2 Procedural issues
If we compare limited liability and single-board public limited com-
panies on the one hand, and dual-board public limited companies on the 
other with regard to the recall of a director, there are differences with 
respect to procedural issues as well as with respect to substantive ones. 
This is the consequence of the legal requirements that are the precondi-
tion for the recall of a director and the obligation to justify and state the 
reasons for such recall in a dual-board public limited company.
The reasoning of the Court in the present case opens the door to 
problems, especially in the case of the recall of a director in limited li-
ability and single-board public limited companies. As already stated, in 
these companies a director may be removed from offi ce without the need 
to justify the removal and without the necessity to state the reasons for 
it. That being so, one may wonder how the court could be in a position 
to scrutinise the recall at all from the substantive point of view. If there 
is only a decision on recall, a recalled director cannot actually claim that 
the removal was not justifi ed, since the law does not oblige the company 
to justify the removal. So, in the situation at hand, how could a preg-
nant director prove that the recall was due to pregnancy if the decision 
to remove her does not state any reason at all? Taking into account the 
ruling of the Court, German legal theory is already advising shareholders’ 
meetings of German limited liability companies to justify their decisions 
to recall pregnant members of the board with certain other reasons and 
facts which are not connected to pregnancy, even though there is no such 
obligation under German law.63 Should the burden of proof then lie on 
the director or on the company? In a lawsuit against a company for the 
illegal recall of an appointment, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff, 
the recalled director. However, in the case of a lawsuit of a pregnant di-
rector, the grounds for the lawsuit are in fact anti-discrimination laws. 
This basically means that the burden of proof is on the company. If it lies 
on the company, it would be its obligation to prove that the removal was 
not due to pregnancy, since there would be a logical natural presumption 
that this was precisely the reason for recall. It would almost be impos-
62  It should at the same time be stressed that there should be no important reason for 
recall if a pregnant director performs her duties. 
63  U Baeck and T Winzer, ‘Mitglied des Vertretungsorgans einer Gesellschaft als Arbeitneh-
mer’ (NZG 2011) 101 <http://beck-online.beck.de> accessed 30 August 2012. 
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sible to prove this. The fi nal consequence would be that anti-discrimina-
tion laws, with all the best intentions, would lead to a practical change 
in the corporate law provisions regarding the recall of directors of certain 
types of companies.
An additional problem might arise if the director was recalled not 
only because she could no longer perform her duties, but also due to the 
internal reorganisation of the company. Should the company then be 
stuck with the current but ineffective organisation which does not match 
its business needs? 
6 Conclusion
When ruling in the case at hand, the Court took into consideration 
the pro-maternity and anti-discriminatory provisions of EU directives, 
namely Council Directive 92/85/EEC, referred to in the fi rst point of 
the judgment and Council Directive 76/207/EEC, referred to in the sec-
ond point of the judgment. An analysis of the Court’s reasoning, com-
bined with the rules of company law and the doctrine of certain European 
countries, indicated the following conclusions for the fi rst and second 
points of the judgment:
1) Pregnant members of the board of directors in dual-board public 
limited companies cannot be considered as ‘workers’ within the meaning 
of Council Directive 92/85/EEC, because their activity is not conducted 
under the direction and control of another body. On the other hand, 
pregnant members of the board of directors in limited liability companies 
and executive offi cers in single-board public limited companies can be 
considered as ‘workers’ within the meaning of Council Directive 92/85/
EEC. The problem in these cases is the fact that under company law 
rules these board members and executives can be recalled from offi ce 
at any time without the reason for their recall being stated. These board 
members do not have the opportunity, unlike board members of public 
limited companies, to scrutinise the decision in court proceedings which 
could result in their reinstatement to the position of board member or 
executive.
2) Council Directive 76/207/EEC basically prohibits the recall of 
board members essentially on account of their pregnancy. It would be 
much easier to apply these rules in the case of a public limited company’s 
board of directors, because the decision of the supervisory board needs 
to be substantiated with reasons for the recall, usually in written form. 
However, if a pregnant member of the board cannot perform her duties in 
an orderly way, according to company law rules, this is reason enough to 
remove the board member from her post. A commercial court judge rul-
ing in a hypothetical case such as the case at hand (but in a public lim-
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ited company) would probably rule in favour of the company if national 
company law rules remain the same as they are now. On the other hand, 
members of boards of directors in limited liability companies and execu-
tive offi cers in single-board public limited companies do not even have 
to be informed of the reasons for their removal from the post, because of 
the corporate governance rules for these types of companies. Commer-
cial court judges would probably have trouble with the implementation 
of anti-discrimination laws in pure and simple corporate proceedings. 
This would especially be the case in new EU Member States, including 
the soon-to-be member Croatia. For example, Ms Danosa’s action was 
dismissed both in the fi rst instance and on appeal prior to the appeal on 
a point of law before the Latvian Supreme Court. This basically means 
that commercial court judges should keep themselves informed of the 
existence of such EU and national legislation and the need to apply not 
only corporate but also anti-discrimination rules. This, however, does 
not mean that widely accepted corporate rules should be undermined 
by anti-discrimination ones. Thus, the termination of a purely corporate 
relationship between a pregnant director and a company should be gov-
erned mainly by company law rules and legislation. The termination of 
a purely contractual relationship between the director and the company 
which is the basis for all welfare and material rights of the pregnant direc-
tor is a separate issue, and this contractual relationship (which includes 
all material rights) should be protected under relevant anti-discrimina-
tion rules. It is important to stress once more that members of the board 
of directors are in fact legal representatives of companies and their posi-
tion is basically similar to the position of employers and not employees. 
Therefore, directors are usually excluded from the protection provided for 
by national labour legislation.64
It once again needs to be stated that the Court does not take into 
account the existence of two different and essentially independent 
relationships (corporate and contractual) between the company and 
the members of the board. The right approach of the Court should be, 
in the authors’ opinion, the protection of the contractual relationship 
between the pregnant member of the board and the company according 
to the applicable EU legislation, leaving at the same time the corporate 
relationship to the widely accepted rules of company law. According to 
this approach, all the material, fi nancial and social rights of the pregnant 
member of the board would be protected, as well as the rights and well-
being of the company as an independent legal entity.
64  For example, the Croatian Labour Act, Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, No 
149/2009, Article 2(4) states that if a member of the board of directors has entered into a 
labour contract with the company, the provisions of the Labour Act governing the termina-
tion of labour contracts are not applied. 
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It should be noted that the extension of the judgment to the corpo-
rate relationship, and analogous possible amendments in national com-
pany law legislation could be counter-productive. It could result in the 
reduction or stagnation of the number of female members of boards of di-
rectors because companies cannot exercise their corporate rights under 
national legislation towards men and women equally, or it could result in 
a decrease in the mandate period for female members of the board.
One should not doubt that such effects were defi nitely not intend-
ed by the Court’s judgment. On the contrary, the Court was no doubt 
motivated simply by the desire to respect and uphold existing anti-dis-
crimination legislation. Equally, the aim of the authors of this note is 
not to undermine the importance of or to criticise anti-discrimination 
law, rather to emphasise the need to take into account their co-existence 
with company law. It seems we are now facing the undesired situation 
that one of them has to be given preference at the expense of the other. 
In order to avoid this, it might be necessary to adopt special provisions 
which would explicitly provide for the preservation of the social rights of 
a pregnant female director, while maintaining the effects of general cor-
porate law.
